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See CriminalLaw.
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Deed.

BAILMENT.

Livery-Stable Keeper--Liability.-The owner of a livery-stable is
bound to exercise ordinary care over the property intrusted to his charge,
and is liable for the negligence of his servants in the performance of any
duty in regard to the care and custody of such property, within the general scope of their employment: Eaton v. Lancaster, 79 or 80 Me.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Certificate of Deposit-emand-Statuteof Limitations.-A certificate of deposit in the ordinary form issued by a bank is, in substance
and legal effect, a promissory note. It is due immediately, and no actual

demand is necessary in order to set the statute of limitations running:
Mitchell v. Wilkins, 36 or 37 Minn.

Payment-Promssory Rotes-Renewal..-A

promissory note given

for a debt, and notes given in renewal, merely extend the credit, and do
not, unless paid, discharge the debt, or give any ground of defence to a
I To appear in 71 or 72 Cal. Rep.
2 To appear in 76 or 77 Ga. Rep.
3 To appear in 79 or SO Me. Rep.
4 To appear in 67 or 68 Md. Rep.
5 To appear in 36 or 37 Minn. Rep.
6 To appear in 7 or 8 Mont. Rep.
T To appear in 49 or 50 N. J. Law
Rep.

N. J. Eq. Rep.
9 To appear in 106 or 107 N. Y. Rep.
10 To appear in 95 or 96 N. C. Rep.
1n To appear in 114 or 115 Pa. St. Rep.
12 To appear in 25 or 26 S. C. Rep.
Is To appear in 81 or 82 Va. Rep.
14 To appear in 29 or 30 W. Va. Rep.
8 To appear in 43 or 44
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suit founded on the original cause of action: ft v. Patterson, 49 or 50
N. J. (Law).
Promissory Notes-Interpretation-Default.-Apromissory note provided that "if default be made in the payment of the interest, as
above provided, then this note shall immediately become due at the
option of the holder thereof." Held, that the holder was entitled only
to a reasonable time after default in which to exercise his option, and
that seven months was not a reasonable time; Crossmore v. Page, 71 or
72 Cal.
COMMON CARRIERS.

Limiting Liability-PriorParol Contrat-Faiureto FurniskCarsSpecial Damages.-A parol undertaking was made by a railroad company to furnish cars on a particular day to transport cattle from a point
in North Carolina to Richmond, with knowledge of the shipper's purpose to have the cattle delivered at the destination in time for a partioular market day. The company failed to have the necessary cars in
readiness, and the shipment was delayed until a later day, when the
cattle were sent, and a bill of lading then given, the form of which limited
the liability of the company as to detention, measure of damages, &c., in
consideration of a reduced rate of freight. ield, that the parol undertaking was not merged in the contract arising out of the bill of lading,
and that the shipper was therefore entitled to damages consequent upon
the detention: Bamilton v. Western . C. R?. Co., 95 or 96 N. C.
It is not error in such case to charge the jury that, if a certain day in
question was a sale day, and the best sale day, and the shipper wished
his cattle to be at their destination on that day, and this was known to
the railroad company, and was in view of both parties when the contract
was made, the shipper would be entitled to such special damages as
actually resulted from the circumstances: Id.
CONSIDERATION.

CONTRACT.

See Estoppel
See Infant.

Fraudulent Conveyances.
Vendor and Vendee.

Construction-Sale-Pledge.-A.,a dealer in drugs, &o., in Boston,
obtained letters of credit on B. Bros., bankers in London, through their
agents in Boston; A. at the time agreeing that "all property which shall
be purchased by means of the within credit, * ** together with the
bill of lading for the same, are hereby pledged and hypothecated to B.
Bros., as collateral security, with authority to take possession and dispose
of the same at discretion for their security and reimbursement;" and, by
means of the credit thus advanced, A. bought a quantity of shellac from
a dealer in Calcutta, the bill of lading being made in the name of B.
Bros. at New York. On the arrival of the property at New York, A.,
who had previously got from B. Bros., agents there, the bills of lading
of other goods for the purpose of warehousing them in the name of B.
Bros., obtained this bill of lading, saying he was going to enter the goods
at the custom-house and warehouse them in the name of B. Bros., and
his receipt for the bill of lading specified this as the only object. Instead of so doing, A. entered the goods in the name of his broker, who
warehoused them, and gave the receipt therefor to A. A. then pledged
this receipt, with others, to M., the plaintiff, for a loan. B. Bros., and
their agents, upon learning of this, seized the goods. M., the plaintiff
then brought an action to recover the value of the goods and damages
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for their seizure, claiming that B. Bros. were only pledgees of, and that
A. was the owner of the property. Held, that B. Bros. having advanced,
at the request of A., their credit for the purchase of the property, and
taken the bill of lading in their own name, and having relied upon the
property as the means of reimbursing themselves, became the owners
and not the pledgees of the property. And their relation to A., the
original mover in the transaction, is that of owners, under a contract to
sell and deliver when the purchase price is paid: Moors v. Kidder, 106
or 107 N. Y.
CORPORATIONS.

Preferred Stocl-Right to Dividends-Net Earnings-Future Indebtedness-,.inkng Fund.-A by-law of a railroad company provided
that "dividends on the preferred stock shall first be made semi-annually
from the net earnings of said road, not exceeding 6 per centum per
annum; after which dividend, if there shall remain a surplus, a dividend shall be made upon the non-preferred stock up to a like per cent.
per annum; and should a surplus then remain of net earnings after both
of said dividends, in any one year, the same shall be divided pro rata
upon all the stock." Weld, that this by-law forming part of the contract of the company with subscribers to the preferred stock, holders
thereof were entitled to a dividend in each year in which any net earnings existed, but, it appearing from the terms of the by-law, that the
whole net earnings were intended to be paid in dividends in each year,
the dividends upon the preferred stock were not cumulative: .Hazeltine
v. BeVast & M. H. L. Rd., 79 or 80 Me.
A railroad company leased its road for a term of fifty years, expiring
in 1920, at the annual rent of $36,000, the lessee undertaking to maintain the track, &c., and keep it in repair. There was a mortgage upon
the road for $150,000, payable in 1890 ; the annual interest thereon
being about $9000. The company had no floating or unsecured debt,
and there was a sum of $22,412 of cash in the treasury after payment
of the current expenses and interest on the mortgage. Reld, that the
company was not entitled, as against the preferred creditors, to retain
the sum of $19,900 as a contribution to a sinking fund to pay off the
mortgage debt when it became due, but that, after payment of the current expenses and the interest on the mortgage, the balance of the rent
received formed the net earnings out of which the dividend to the preferred stockholders was payable: Id.
.CREDITOR'S BILL.

Insolveng-Parties.-To a creditor's bill to annul deeds made by a
debtor, on the ground of fraud, alleging that the debtor was thereafter
adjudged a bankrupt, and had never obtained a discharge, the assignee
in bankruptcy is a necessary party : Tabb v. Hughes, 81 or 82 Va.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Practice- rial-Presenceof Accused.-After convictions of arson
and house-burning, motions for new trials were made on behalf of the
accused, but in his absence. Subsequently, while personally present in
court, he was given an opportunity to renew the motions, but he declined to do so. Held, that the error of proceeding with the motions
in his absence was thereby cured: Bond v. Commonwealth, 81 or 82 Va.
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Homicide-Insanity as a Defence- Argument of Counsel.-On indictment for murder, where the defence is insanity, the court may in its
discretion permit counsel for the prosecution to read to the jury decisions of English and American courts on such defence : Territory v.
.arl, 7or 8 Mont.
DAMAGES. See Common Carrier. False Imprisonment.
DEED.
Construction- Conveyance in Trust-Alienation-MunicipalCo porations-Sale of Real Estate-otie.-A conveyance of property to the
mayor and council of Baltimore city, on which it was proposed to erect
a McDonough Institute, "in trust for the uses and purposes, afid subject to the limitations, powers and provisions" expressed in a city ordinance on the subject, but containing no other words of.restriction or
limitation on the right of alienation on the part of the grantee, vests in
the mayor and council an absolute fee-simple title to the property so
conveyed: Newbold v. Glenn, 67 or 68 Md.
The mayor and city council of Baltimore sold certain property belonging to the city, at private sale, without complying with the statute authorizing the sale of the city property, which requires notice of such
proposed sale to be given in a newspaper printed in Baltimore city once
a week for three successive weeks. Held, that the property being sold
for its full value, in the absence of fraud or collusion, such sale was
valid, and vested a good title in the purchaser: 1d.
E eecution of by Attorney-Signing Deed-Insertionof Wrong Name
-Effect.-A deed was signed by an attorney-in-fact in his own name as
attorney for the grantors. Held, that the execution was defective, but
in equity was good as an execution of the power, and would vest the
equitable title in the grantees: Ramage v. Ramage, 25 or 26 S. C.
A deed was made naming M. R. and J. C. R. as grantees. M. R. had
paid all of the purchase-money, and expected the deed to name herself
and (. P. R. as grantees. In consequence of the representations of J.
C. R., the grantor inserted his name, and he went into possession of the
land. Held, that if J. C. R. had authority to procure the insertion of"
his name, he held it in trust for M. R.; if he had no authority, but obtained it by misrepresentation, the deed was void: Id.
DIVIDENDS. See Corporations.
EJECTMENT.

See Infant.

ELECTIONS.

County Seat-Re-location-Contest-E-xeceptions-Mandamus.-The
fifteenth section of chapter 5 of the acts of 1881 (Worth's Amended
Code, c. 39, § 15), provides that the clerk of the county court shall lay
before the county court, at its next session after an election wherein a
vote has been taken on the re-location of a county seat, the separate
certificates of the precinct commissioners of the vote on this question,
at each precinct, and the law then provides: "The said court shall
thereupon ascertain and declare the result of said vote, and enter the
same of record." Held, under this law any voter of the county has a
right to appear and contest the validity of these returns, and ask that
the court go behind these returns and ascertain what was the actual
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legal vote cast at such election for and against re-location, and has a right
to demand that the evidence he offers be heard on this question ; and,
if the coart refuse to permit him to be heard, he has a right to demand
of them to settle and sign a bill of exceptions, setting out the refusal of
the court to permit him to be beard or to introduce any evidence on the
question before them. And if they refuse to sign and settle such bill
of exceptions, the circuit court may, by mandamus, compel them to do
so, and then perfect their record so that the action of the county court
in this matter may be reviewed on writ of certiorari by the circuit
court: Poteet v. Cabell County, 29 or 30 W. Va.
ESTOPPEL.

Declarations-Privity-Assinmentof Mortgage.-Plaintiffin ejectment claimed title under a mortgage foreclosure. The defendant was
the mortgagor's grantor. The consideration of the mortgage was in
part a prior mortgage and debt to other parties, which were assigned to
the subsequent mortgagee. Held, that by such purchase the subsequent
mortgagee succeeded to all the rights of the prior mortgagees, and was
in direct privity with them; and evidence of declarations of the defendant to the prior mortgagees, at the time that mortgage was made, to the
effect that he bad sold the land to the mortgagor, and that it was hers,
as well as evidence of similar declarations to the subsequent mortgagee
before his mortgage was made, are admissible, and will operate as an
estoppel upon defendant from setting up a claim to the land in opposition
thereto: Wardlaw v. Rayford, 25 or 26 S. C.
To Claim Ttle-Effeet of Deed-Belief and Declarations.-The
facts that a purchaser at a sheriff's sale did not believe and had no idea
that the levy, and the deed to him thereunder, covered a certain part
of the tract sold, and that he subsequently made declarations to that
effect, both orally and in writing, do not estop him from setting up title
to such part of an action of ejectment against him to recover it, where
the return on the levy and the deed call for it: Stroup v. .cCloskey,
114 or 115 Penn. St.
Maker of Note - Representatims to Purchaser- Failure of
Consideration-gnoranceof Facts by Maker.-A. having purchased
a jackass of B., at B.'s request gave his note for part of the purchasemoney to T., a creditor of B. After the note became due, the plaintiffs,
with a view to purchasing it, asked A. if the note was all right; and he
replied that "it was all right, and that he expected to pay it the first
of January." Upon this information the plaintiffs purchased the note.
Held, in a suit upon the note, that A. was estopped from pleading a
failure of consideration: Lites v. Addison, 25 or 26 S. C.
Such estoppel was effectual, even though A. was at the time unaware
of the facts on which he based his defence of a failure of consideration : Id.
EVEDENCE.
Documentary-Copyof Poll-Book.-Defendants,who had been judges
and clerks of election, were on trial for conspiring to count and return illegal votes cast at a municipal election, and falsely returning and counting
such votes, and entering on the poll-books the names of persons who did
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not vote at said election. Held, that to prove that the persons named in
the indictment as having been falsely returned as voting did not in fact
vote, the certified copy of the registration poll-book of the precinct, kept
by a challenger, in which he checked off the names of all persons voting,
supported by his own testimony and that of another witness, who had
charge of the book during the challenger's temporary absence, that the
contents of the book were true, was competent evidence: Owens v. State,
67 or 68 Md.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

Damages-nadequac.-Though an arrest without warrant be justifiable, yet to detain the prisoner longer than a reasonable time for suing
out a warrant, then to handcuff him, carry him out of the county, and
there incarcerate him for days under no warrant whatever, is false imprisonment, if not kidnapping, and a finding by the jury of twenty-five
dollars damages is no compensation for the injury: Potter v. Swindle,
76 or 77 Ga.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

Conveyance to Son-Consideration.-A father who was largely in
debt, and harassed by creditors, conveyed to his son, who lived with
him, and who was possessed of limited means, apparently inadequate to
pay the. purchase-money, a tract of land, by a deed acknowledged and
recorded more than a year after the date of the execution, for the express
consideration of $3000, payable, $500 in cash, $500 on demand, and the
balance in annual payments of $500 each, reserving no lien for the deferred payments, and following the conveyance by no change in the
occupancy of the property. The evidence showed the express consideration to be both inadequate and not bona fide. Held, that the conveyance was fraudulent and void as to the creditors of the father. FAUNTLEROY, J., dissenting: Hickman's Executors v. Trout, 81 or 82 Va.
INFANT.

Disaffirmance of Contract-Return of Consideration--JectmentNotice of Disaffirmance-Reovery for Improvements.-In an action.of
ejectment, defendant answered that he had purchased the land from
plaintiff while the latter was a minor, and had paid him the price agreed
upon, and taken a written obligation from him to make a deed when he
came of age, and had also taken a written obligation from plaintiff's
father, for a valuable consideration, binding him to have a deed made
by his son when the latter came of age. No other consideration passed
on either agreement than the price paid for the lot. .Held, that under
these peculiar facts plaintiff was not obliged, in order to maintain the
action, to allege a return of the consideration, or inability to return it:
0141.7 v. Pate, 7 or 8 Mont.
In such a case no notice of disaffirmance is required to be given before
commencing the action, and where the defendant has made some improvements on the land during minority, and there has been no fraud or
concealment on the part of the plaintiff, the former cannot recover from
the plaintiff, therefor, but must look to the father: Id.
INSANITY.
INSOLVENCY.

See Criminal Law.
See Creditor'sBi.
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MORTGAGE. See Estoppel.
Validity-nvalidity of Note-Alteration.-A mortgage on real
estate, given to secure a debt, the amount and terms of which sufficiently
appear therein, is valid, and may be enforced against the estate of the
maker, although the note representing the same debt is declared void,
because of a material alteration made therein by the payee after the
death of the maker : Smith v. Smith, 25 or 26 S. 0.
MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS.
See Deed.
NOTICE. See Deed.

PARTNERSHIP.

Existence and Termination of-Setting Aside a Confession of Judgment.-In a suit to have a certain transaction between the complainant
and the defendants declared to be a partnership, and to set aside a judgment confessed by complainant in favor of a third party for the benefit
of one of the defendants, it appeared that the agreement of association
provided that complainant should make saddle-trees for which complainant owned a patent jointly with defendants; that one of the latter
should provide the money, and the other should act as legal attorney,
each party to receive one-third of the profits. One of the defendants
destroyed the agreement of association, with the consent of complainant,
at a time when a suit was pending for infringement, to which complainant and such defendant were made defendants. The attorney defendant,
acting as attorney for his co-defendant, his brother, and for complainant, induced the latter to confess judgment in favor of a third party, in
order to protect his brother in respect of the money advanced by him.
Held, that there was a co-partnership which continued notwithstanding
the destruction of the agreement, or that, at all events, the assets of the
business were subject to all the consequences of such relation, even
though such destruction were a dissolution, and that the judgment
should be declared void : Teas v. Woodruff, 43 or 44 N. J. Eq.
PLEDGE. See Contract.
SALE. See Contract. Deed.
TRIAL. See Criminal Law.
TRUST.

See Deed.

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Executory Contract-Rights of Purchasers.-A purchaser of land,
while part of the price remained unpaid, and before the legal title had
been conveyed to him, conveyed a portion of the land to A. After the
purchaser's death, all the right, title and interest of his estate in and to
the land was sold under order of the probate court to B., who had notice
of A.'s claim, but who paid to the original vendor the balance due on
the purchase price, and obtained a deed to the whole land to himself.
In a suit by B. against A., to quiet title, in which A. filed a cross-bill,
held, that B. took title subject to the equitable rights of A. in the part
of the land conveyed to him, and that A., although not entitled to a
decree declaring B. to have no right, title or interest in such part, was
entitled to a conveyance of such part from B. ; but this, only on condition that A. pay to B. a ratable proportion of the sum paid to the latter
to get the title to the whole: flilton v. Young, 71 or '72 Cal.

